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SEARCHING FOR THE INTENT OF THE
FRAMERS OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
by Robert J. Kaczorowski*
N 1946 JUSTICE HUGO BLACK DECLARED that one of the
objects of the fourteenth amendment was to apply the Bill of
Rights to the States.' He was confident that an analysis of the intent
of the framers of the amendment would support his assertion. A few
years later the Supreme Court requested such an investigation, but
when the analysis was made and the results presented to it, the Supreme Court concluded that the framers' intent could not be determined. 2
Since courts have frequently based decisions upon their findings
as to the intent of the framers of a constitutional amendment or a
specific legislative act, the Supreme Court's conclusion that the intent
behind the fourteenth amendment cannot be determined is of great
significance to the application of the amendment to subsequent cases
that have come before the courts. Moreover, the Supreme Court's conclusion is surprising in that it attributes some special or unusual
qualities to the fourteenth amendment and, by implication, impeaches an established method of adjudication. The study requested by the
Supreme Court is only one of several which have been conducted before and since the School Desegregation Cases.
The uncertainty surrounding the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment has had profound implications on the application
of that amendment to civil rights issues. It has probably led the Supreme Court to take a moderate position on the authority over civil
rights which the amendment confers upon the national government,
thereby largely limiting the application of the amendment to state
action.3 Even that authority has been usually limited to positive forms
*The author received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Minnesota
and is currently Assistant Professor of History at Wagner College.
1. Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
2. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court
ordered studies be made of the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment. Chief Justice Earl Warren, in the majority opinion, ruled the studies inconclusive. Id. at 489.
3. Long-standing precedents date back to U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1875); U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); and The Civil Rights Cases 109 U.S. 3
(1883): See L. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS (1966) and P. L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918-1969 at 413-414 (1972).
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of state action, such as unequal laws and discriminatory policies of
public officials; it has not been extended to negative forms of state
inaction such as the failure of public agencies and officials to protect
civil rights from violations by private sources. Consequently, infringements of civil rights by private parties have not been proscribed by
the fourteenth amendment.
The inability of the federal government to reach private forms of
discrimination by application of the fourteenth amendment has
forced Congress to adopt highly controversial and, to many, specious
legislation. For example, Congress aggravated opposition to an already controversial issue by outlawing under the commerce clause,4
discrimination in privately owned places of public accommodations.
The Supreme Court has added to its critics by acquiescing in this Congressional act. 5 Furthermore, by basing the protection of civil rights
on grounds other than the rights themselves, Congress and the courts
have put such protection upon a very tenuous foundation; a hostile
Congress might repeal the law; or a hostile Court might find such
laws an unconstitutional extension of the commerce power. More seriously, the Court has accepted the apparently erroneous judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause by assuming that civil rights are not among the privileges
and immunities of United States citizens which the framers intended
the federal government to secure. 6 Congress and the Supreme Court
have thus left unresolved the question of what is the full responsibility
of the national government for protecting the rights of its citizens.
The absence of a conclusive and persuasive assessment of the intent
of the framers of the fourteenth amendment has thus had a profound
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
5. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung.
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
6. Butchers" Benovelent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live Stock Landing and
Slaughter House Co., 16 Wall. 36 (1973). The contradiction between the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House
Cases, Cruikshank, Harris, and the Civil Rights Cases, and the recent interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in Jones v. Mayer Co., 342 U.S. 409 (1968)
(prohibiting discrimination by private individuals in the leasing, renting, or selling
of property) becomes apparent upon realizing that the fourteenth amendment
was acknowledged to have incorporated the Civil Rights Act. The same same men
enacted the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act within two months
of one another and it was felt that both had the same scope and effect. Thus, the
application of the reasoning in Jones v. Mayer Co., to fourteenth amendment
cases could result in a reversal of the Slaughterhouse ruling.
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impact upon the law and civil rights. This study will show that the
uncertainty surrounding the intent of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment is due less to any special difficulties inherent in the
amendment and he circumstances surrounding its adoption, than
to the inadequacies and errors of the studies that have been made
on the subject. Hopefully, this study will also demonstrate that inquiries into the intent of the framers of any laws or constitutional
amendments are an historical rather than a judicial or legal function.
This task is best performed by professionally trained historians who
seek an understanding of past actions as the actors perceived them,
rather than by legal scholars or lawyers, untrained in historical
methodology and conceptualization who seek to resolve the issues of
their own times. Studies of tlie fourteenth amendment will be analysed to demonstrate the methodological and conceptual errors that
produced erroneous conclusions concerning the intent of the framers.
Out of this analysis will emerge suggestions for a more conclusive and
accurate assessment of the framers' intent and what that assessment
might find; specifically, that the framers intended to provide the national government with full authority over civil rights, which they
believed to be the same as the privileges and immunities of the United
States citizenship. With this concept of he fourteenth amendment,
the Supreme Court could resurrect the amendment's long dormant
privileges and immunities clause, confront civil rights issues squarely
as denials of rights of United States citizens, and apply the protection
of the national government to any infringements, whether the result
of state action, state inaction, or actions of private individuals. This
would not only make the national protection of civil rights full and
complete, but would place that protection beyond the reach of future
legislative repeal.
Constitutional historian Paul L. Murphy has noted that judicial
appeals to history have been especially prevalent in recent years.1 He

7. Murphy, Time To Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitu.
tional History, 64 AM. HisT. REV. 64 (1963); for other discussion of judicial uses of
history see C. A. MILLER, THE SuPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969);
Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 89;
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 119; and,
while critical of the court's reasoning, R. L. Kohl offers historical evidence to
show that its decision was correct in The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Comes
Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272 (1969).
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has also noted, however, that lawyers are poorly trained to investigate
the past and reach valid conclusions about it. Their lack of training
in the use of historical materials and methodology has frequently
produced inaccurate and erroneous judgments about the past. Too
frequently the legal profession has relied upon historical works long
outdated. Limited in their perspective by their role as advocates confined to the facts of a present issue, lawyers have attempted to find
in the past, answers to the specific issues confronting them in the
court room. This "presentism" has led many lawyers, as well as historians attempting to achieve similar purposes, to confuse their problems, questions and perceptions with those of persons of the past.
Thus, the lawyer-historian living in the mid-twentieth century, forced
to deal with specific issues in a specific legal and historical context,
asks of historical figures what they did about the same issues in the
hope of eliciting some guides for the present.
The futility of such a process is obvious, for one cannot determine
what people of an earlier day intended by their behavior if one asks
of them a question of present concern. The questions that have been
asked of the past have been the wrong questions, and the context of
evaluating past behavior has also been erroneous for one cannot read
back into history one's own definitions and historical context. So,
when the litigants in the School Desegregation Cases went back to
the 1860's seeking answers to the problem of school desegregation in
the 1950's, the answers they found were inconclusive. Their conclusions could not have been otherwise, since school desegregation was
not the issue with which American society was involved in the 1860's.
Lawyer-historians have also restricted themselves to the use of a
narrow selection of historical materials. They have relied too heavily
for legal definitions upon Supreme Court decisions, thus overlooking
lower federal and state court decisions as well as opinions of legal
scholars not associated with the courts. Moreover, they have attempted
to define the intent of the framers of specific enactments by using
almost exclusively congressional or legislative debates. The materials
of the historian are as varied as the records of man, and to understand
the meaning of the actions of historical figures, the historian must
carefully select all the materials necessary to conceptualize the framework within which these figures were operating.
However, not even the right materials will benefit the observer who
makes erroneous assumptions about the past. Lawyer-historians, like
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professional historians, have frequently based their studies upon incorrect historical assumptions. This article will show that the studies
of the fourteenth amendment over the last eighty years have been
predicated upon the assumption that the civil rights program of the
Reconstruction period was the product of a small group of extremists
who were out of step with the rest of Northern society.8 Furthermore,
most of these studies either implicitly assume or explicitly state that
these Radicals,9 in proposing their civil rights program, had little or
no regard for the Negro, but were motivated by self-seeking political
goals and a desire for revenge against the South. Even those who see
the Radicals as sincerely concerned with Negro rights, nevertheless
assume that this concern was not shared by the general population.
Thus, it is assumed that even if the Radicals were working to enact
a meaningful civil rights program, an unsympathetic public refused
to provide the support necessary for the success of the program. Consequently, proposals which had ostensibly purported to benefit the
Negro are seen either as mere political strategems or as providing the
Negro with only minimal security. What was proclaimed to be an
exercise of the absolute power of national government over protection
8. The studies to which these comments are directed are essentially those
analyzed in this paper.
9. The term "Radical" was applied to a group of Congressional Republicans
who were ostensibly led by Charles Sumner in the Senate and Thaddeus Stevens
in the House and were thought to be characterized by a desire for vengeance against
the South as evidenced by their desire to indefinitely exclude the Southern states
from the union; by uncompromising loyalty toward the Freedmen because of their
support for Negro suffrage; and as implacable enemies of President Johnson because of their unreasoning opposition to his plan of restoring the Southern states
to the Union as quickly and with as little change as possible. However, this term
was applied indiscriminately by Democrats and conservative supporters of President
Johnson to any one or any proposal that sought to aid the Freedmen or advance
the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction against the President's policy, which
would have left the Southern state governments in the hands of former Confederate
leaders. While individuals within the Republican Party can be identified as
"Radicals," their radicalism consisted less in the positions they took on the issues
or the unanimity with which they voted on them than in their timing; for they
embraced these positions earlier than the other members of their party. Since the
rest of the party came almost universally to accept their positions, the "Radicals"
were actually the vanguard of the Republican Party. Therefore, the term "Radical"
served more as an epithet for pro-Negro and anti-Southern views than it did as a
description of specific positions on the issues confronting the United States after
the Civil War. See E. L. McKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCrION 53-67
(1960); H. L. TREFoUSSE, THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS (1969); LINCOLN'S VANGUARD
FOR RADICAL JUSTICE (1969), and for the best analyses of the literature on Reconstruction, see note 18 infra.
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of fundamental rights has been interpreted by most observers as a
constitutionally innocuous tactic to keep the South under Radical
control. At best, it is thought to have minimally increased the power
of national government over fundamental rights.
Almost all of these studies have looked at the issue of civil rights
isolated from the more pervasive problems of Reconstruction of
which it was a part. Nor have Reconstruction and civil rights been
analyzed as problems which evolved out of the issues of the Civil War.
Thus, these studies, by limiting their consideration of earlier civil
rights issues exclusively to the specific issues of their own time, have
reached conclusions which are incomplete at best and erroneous at
worst.
The first scholarly studies of the fourteenth amendment were made
at the turn of the century. Some of these early studies gave the fourteenth amendment a broad scope and an expansive definition. John
W. Burgess, a constitutional scholar and political scientist, wrote in
1890 that, through the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, the
national government absorbed complete power over the whole
domain of civil liberty. Furthermore, he agreed with the dissenting
opinions in the Slaughterhouse Cases which insisted that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights.' 0 Burgess claimed
that after seventy years of debate and four years of war, the nation
gave its first attention to the nationalization in constitutional law of the domain of civil liberty. There is no doubt
that those who framed the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments intended to occupy the whole ground and thought
they had done so. The opposition charged that these amendments would nationalize the whole sphere of civil liberty;
the majority accepted the view; and the legislation of the
Congress for their elaboration and enforcement proceeded
upon that view. 1 '
Burgess' interpretation of the fourteenth amendment as incorporating the Bill of Rights was shared by Horace E. Flack, a fellow in
political science at Johns Hopkins University.1 2 Flack found support
10. J. W. BURGESS,
227-230 (1890).

I POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CoNsTrruTIONAL L w

11. J. W. BURGESS, supra note 10, at 225.
12. H. E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENT
19-20, 40, 45, 57, 58-59, 152-3 (1908).
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for this interpretation in contemporary newspapers, state legislative
debates on the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, and early
cases involving the Civil Rights Act. 13 He concluded that this evidence
demonstrated that contemporaries believed that Congress intended
to nationalize the Bill of Rights. Nevertheless, while Flack and
Burgess interpreted Congress' intent as bringing the Bill of Rights
within the protective shield of the national government, they also
believed that the power thus conferred was restricted to violations of
these rights resulting from state action. 14 Both men exemplify the influence of the Supreme Court decisions concerning the fourteenth
13. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 STAT. 27, was enacted by Congress just
two months before it proposed the fourteenth amendment for ratification by the
states. The Act defined United States citizenship and spelled out certain civil rights
of U. S. citizens. Those specified were the rights to make and enforce contracts, to
be parties to suits, to give testimony in the courts, to purchase, lease, rent and inherit property, the right to equal punishment for crime, and the right "to full and
equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property..."
It also specified that any person who infringed these rights was liable to fine and
imprisonment, that the federal courts were to have jurisdiction over "all crimes
and offenses committed against the provisions of the act, . . . of all causes, civil
and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or
judicial tribunals of the states or locality where they may be any of the rights
secured to them by the first section of this act ..
" The Act further obliges
federal officials as well as the military to carry out the provisions of the act under
penalty of a $1,000 fine.
14. J. W. BURGESS, supra note 10, at 22. J. W. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
CONSTITUTION, 1866-1876 at 76-77 (1902); H. E. FLACK, supra note 12, at 21-22.
That the framers perceived the problem concerning civil rights as one in which
whites as well as blacks were involved and one that included infringements by
private individuals as well as state action and state inaction is evident from their
correspondence with Union loyalists and officials in the South, testimony given at
committee hearings and speeches made by them. See, e.g., Letters from John C.
Underwood to Samuel P. Chase, May 21, 1866 (container 97), Samuel P. Chase
Papers, Library of Congress (hereinafter cited as L. C.); Grant Goodrich to Lyman
Trumbull, Feb. 1, 1866 (Vol. 63, reel 17); Trumbull to Mrs. Gary, June 27, 1866
(Vol. 57, reel 19), Lyman Trumbull Papers, L. C., Microfilm Collection; Brig. Gen.
J. W. Sprague to John Sherman, April 4, 1866 (Vol. 98), John Sherman Papers,
L. C.; Gen. George A. Custer to Zachariah Chandler, Jan. 14, 1866 (container 4),
Zachariah Chandler Papers, L. C.; REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTiON AT THE FIRST SESSION THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS (1866); see especially the

comments of the author of the Civil Rights Act, Senator Lyman Trumbull of
Illinois, answering the criticism that the Act was intended to subject state officials
to punishment for faithfully discharging their duties: "Not state officials especially,
but everybody who violates the law. It is the intention to punish everybody who
violates the law." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist. Sess. 500 (1866), for fuller discussion of this point see R. KACZOROwsKI, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS:
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY PRACTICE IN A RACIST SOCIETY, 1866-1883, 1971 (unpub-

lished dissertation).
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amendment upon scholars' perceptions of the framers' intent. Neither
Burgess nor Flack saw the contradiction inherent in their broad view
of the powers conferred upon the national government and their view
of the amendment's restricted application to state action. They overlooked as well the rule handed down by Chief Justice John Marshall
in McCulloch v. Maryland'5 which stated that Congress may exercise
its powers in whatever way it deems appropriate. If the National government was given the power over Bill of Rights guarantees, it could
utilize that power in whatever way and to whatever extent it deemed
appropriate, not simply against the States.
The first professionally trained historian to investigate the intent
of the framers of the fourteenth amendment was Benjamin A. Kendrick,16 a student of William Dunning who had a profound impact
upon Reconstruction historiography. The Dunning, or "New South,"
School attempted to redeem the South's reputation from the acrimonious charges made against it during the Civil War and Reconstruction. Enhancing the South's reputation, however, required a corresponding diminution of the reputations of the men regarded to
be most responsible for Reconstruction. It is not surprising, therefore,
that Kendrick's view of Reconstruction portrayed a vengeful group
of Radical Republicans using Negro rights as a vehicle to perpetuate
their political ascendancy. He viewed Congressional Reconstruction,
then, as an essentially selfish political power play by which the
Radicals intended to consolidate their power over the national
government.
Thus, Kendrick did not see that the problem confronting the nation in 1866 involved the nature of freedom for whites as well as
blacks, the role and power of the national government in securing
freedom, and how this freedom was to be translated into statutory
law and constitutional amendments. Ignoring these problems, and
overly concerned with the political question of Negro suffrage, Kendrick failed to see the significance of the framers equating natural
rights with the status of freedom conferred by the thirteenth amendment upon all inhabitants of the United States. He wrote that
17
"[e]mancipation vitalizes only natural rights, not political rights";
15.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).

16. B. B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong. 1865-67 (1914) in COLUMBIA UNIV. STUDIES Vol. 62 (1914).

17. Id. at 203; see also id. at 227-230.
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but he overlooked the implications of that statement for federal citizenship. Since natural rights were traditionally protected by the states,
by empowering the federal government to secure these rights the
thirteenth amendment would have had to incorporate these rights
into United States citizenship.
The Dunning School of Analysis has dominated American' conceptions of Reconstruction and of the Radical Republicans down to recent times.' 8 In addition to this unfavorable view of Reconstruction,
constitutional scholars have also been influenced by an interpretation
of the fourteenth amendment by the Supreme Court that virtually
transforms the amendment into an instrument of economic laissezfaire benefitting industrial and business development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 19 Proceeding from a hostile view of
Reconstruction and a judicial application of the fourteenth amendment that was probably unforseen by its framers, constitutional scholars have not been able to settle satisfactorily the question of intent.
When Justice Black asserted that no one had examined the intent of
the framers of the fourteenth amendment and that such an examination would reveal that the framers intended to incorporate the Bill
of Rights, he reflected the legal profession's unfamiliarity with the
limitations of existing historical writing and analysis and the methods
and problems of historiography.
One of the most influential legal studies of the question was made
by Charles Fairman in 1948.20 Fairman's study attempted to test Jus-

18.

The best analyses of the literature on Reconstruction are L. Kincaid,

Victim of Circumstance: An Interpretation of Changing Attitudes Toward Republican Policy Makers and Reconstruction, 57 J. Am.HIsT. 48 (1970); LaWanda and
John Cox, Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation

in Reconstruction Historiography,38 J. So. HIST. 303 (1967); Weisberger, The Dark
and Bloody Ground of Reconstruction Historiography,25 J. So. HIST. 427 (1959).
19. The "conspiracy theory'* of the fourteenth amendment which depicts the
framers as conspiratorially devising an instrument for the protection of property
interests behind the smoke screen of equal rights has been well settled; the author
will therefore avoid going into that question. See Graham, The "Conspiracy
Theory" of The Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L. J. 371 (1937) and 48 YALE
L. J. 171 (1938); Boudin, Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment,
16 N. Y. U. L. REV. 19 (1938); Hurst, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 851 (1939).
20. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1948) Other aspects of Fairman's analysis is subjected to an exhaustive critique by William Crosskey in Charles Fairman, "Legislative History"
and the ConstitutionalLimitations on State Authority, to which Fairman responded
in A Reply to Professor Crosskey, both in 22 U. Cm.L. REv. 1 and 144 respectively
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tice Black's suggestion that perhaps the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights. Fairman thought that for an accurate
determination of Congress' intent, one must not simply run through
the debates looking for the use of the term "Bill of Rights" but rather,
"'one needs to catch the spirit of the occasion, to listen patiently to
speeches referring even obliquely to our subject, to consider reflectively the necessary implications of comments on drafting that culminated in the clauses of Section 1."21 One must also go beyond the
views of the framers, and "appreciate the significance of the action
of the state legislatures when they considered ratification."
Fairman, apparently comprehensive in his perspective, noted the
importance of the Freedman's Bureau and Civil Rights Bills of 1866
to an understanding of the actions of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment. Thus, he noted Senator Lyman Trumbull's comments
concerning the purpose and intent of the Civil Rights Bill and concluded that Trumbull, the Bill's author, intended to extend the protection of Congress to the inalienable rights of free men as possessed
by every United States citizen. According to Fairman, Trumbull apparently equated these inalienable rights with the privileges and immunities of United States citizens. Fairman did not, however, explore
the possibility that others defined these concepts in the same way,
despite the fact that he included in his article the comments of Democratic Congressman Michael C. Kerr of Indiana who criticized the Bill
precisely because he believed it attempted to give Congress the power
to enforce the Bill of Rights. Fairman dismissed Trumbull's definitions, saying that he had read and quoted his authorities uncritically.
Instead of using the definitions of the Bill's author as an indication
of the Bill's intent. Fairman rejected them as incorrect.2
It is interesting to note that Fairman overlooked a similar definition of the Bill given in the House by its floor manager, James F.
Wilson of Iowa. Fairman would have considered Wilson's definitions
incorrect as well, for having cited the same authorities as Trumbull,
Wilson said: "From this it is easy to gather an understanding that
civil rights are the natural rights of man; and these are the rights
(1954). Professor of political scienoe and law at Harvard University, Fairman is also
the biographer of Supreme Court Justice Samuel F. Miller. who wrote the majority
opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases which made the initial narrow definition of
the fourteenth amendment.
21. Fairman, supra note 20, at 5-6.
22. Id. at 16-18, 39.
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which this bill proposes to protect every citizen in the enjoyment of
throughout the entire dominion of the Republic."2 3 Since he defined
civil rights by the all-encompassing concept, "natural rights of man,"
Wilson actually sacrificed breadth for precision when he later said,
"Now, sir, in relation to the great fundamental rights embraced in
the bill of rights, the citizen being possessed of them is entitled to a
remedy.. . ." Wilson then went on to argue that Congress could provide that remedy when the states failed to do so and that this was the
24
object of the Bill.
Fairman overlooked the comments of many other senators and congressmen that indicated the framers' intent. In fact, Fairman included
statements of only five Senators (only two of whom supported the
Bill) and only four Congressmen (again, only two of whom supported
the Bill) concerning the Civil Rights Bill. The only comments he included which could be used to explicate the concepts of the Bill were
Senator Trumbull's which he simply dismissed as incorrect. The
views of one of the Senators on the Bill's constitutionality which Fairman did present, he at best presented incorrectly. He stated that
Senator Reverdy Johnson, Democrat from Maryland, who was generally regarded as one of the best legal minds in the State, believed
the Bill to be without any constitutional authority whatsoever. In
fact, however, Johnson said, in the very speech that Fairman had
cited, that Congress had the authority to pass the Bill and to protect
United States citizens in their basic rights, as these had been defined
by Senator Trumbull. What he protested as unconstitutional was the
attempt to include Negroes within that protection since the Supreme
Court in the Dred Scott Case25 specifically excluded Negroes from
United States citizenship. Johnson argued that for Negroes to enjoy
this protection as citizens of the nation, a constitutional amendment
was necessary. Furthermore, he urged in the same speech that such
an amendment be adopted. So, Johnson was not arguing that the
attempt of Congress to protect the fundamental rights of United
States citizens was unconstitutional, as Fairman stated. On the contrary, Johnson said that to deny that Congress had such power was
disgraceful. It was only after President Johnson vetoed the Bill that
23. CON(.

GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1117 (1866).
24. Id. at 1294.
25. Johnson had successfully argued the Dred Scott Case before the Supreme
Court.

1972-73]

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Senator Johnson opposed the effort to protect basic rights of United
26
States citizens.
A more careful, thorough and "reflective consideration" of these
debates might have prevented these factual and interpretive errors.
It certainly would have shown that Senator Trumbull and Congressman Wilson were not the only framers of the Civil Rights Bill who
defined the privileges and immunities of United States citizens as
the inalienable and natural rights of free men. One of the "necessary
implications of comments" which equated and interchanged such
terms as "privileges and immunities," "civil rights," "natural rights of
free men," "fundamental rights of free men" and "the rights to life,
liberty and property" 27 is that virtually every senator and congressman
operated under such a definition.
These concepts were so fully discussed in Congress in February and
March, 1866 in relation to the Civil Rights Bill that an exhaustive
discussion was unnecessary when in May and June of that year the
same concepts were again before Congress in the form of Section I of
the fourteenth amendment. While Fairman noted the importance of
the debates leading to the adoption of the Civil Rights Act to an
understanding of the framers' intent, he ignored much of the content
of these debates and, having discovered that relatively little discussion
was given to section I of the amendment, he concluded that "the
spirit of the occasion" was political and that the framers of the fourteenth amendment were really unconcerned with constitutional questions. "We must remind ourselves, too," he said, "that that was the
Age of Hate in American politics-that a tremendous struggle was
going on within the party that had saved the Union and between the
Congressional leaders and the President."' 8 The Radicals won this
political struggle, he continued, and the fourteenth amendment was
the fruit of their political victory.
The assumption that Reconstruction was an Age of Hate and that
the framers were politically, motivated prompted Fairman to find
26. Fairman, supra note 20, at 16-19, 37-41; Cong. Globe. supra note 23. 504509, 528-530, 574, 1775-1778; B. C. STEINER, LIFE OF REVrE Y JoHNSON 118.125 (1949).
Fairman fails to identify correctly one of the Congressmen. He mentions "Martin
F. Thayer" with the intention of referring, presumably, to M. Russell Thay'er.
27. See, e.g., the comments of Congressmen Frederick E. Woodbridge, James
F. Wilson, John A. Bingham, and Sienator Jacob Howard. quoted elsewhere in
the text.
28. Fairman, supra note 20. at 9.
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other motives for evidence that suggested a deeper concern for the
basic rights of United States citizens. For example, he quoted Republican Congressman Frederick E. Woodbridge of Vermont speaking on
the fourteenth amendment.
It merely gives the power to Congress to enact those laws which
will give to a citizen of the United States the natural rights which
necessarily pertain to citizenship. It is intended to enable Congress by its enactments when necessary to give to a citizen of the
United States, in whatever State he may be, those privileges and
immunities which are guaranteed to him under the Constitution
of the United States. It is intended to enable Congress to give to
all citizens the inalienable rights of life and liberty, and to every
citizen in whatever state he may be that protection to his property
2
which is extended to the other citizens of the state. D
But Fairman dismissed this explanation of the framers' intent because, "one will observe, [it] is rather hazy. Congress was to be given
power to give to the citizen his natural inalienable rights to life and
liberty, the privileges and immunities already guaranteed to him by
the Constitution, and as to his property the same protection that the
local law extended to the local citizens."3 0 Fairman failed to appreciate that the national protection of these rights and guarantees was
necessary because they were being violated by private action with the
approval and cooperation of state authorities and/or state law. Congressman Wilson, in the speech quoted above, cited this predicament
as evidence of the necessity for Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act:
We are establishing no new right, declaring no new principle. It
is not the object of this bill to establish new rights, but to protect
and enforce those which already belong to every citizen. I am
aware, sir, that this doctrine is denied in many of the States; but
this only proves the necessity for the enactment of the remedial
and protective features of this bill. If the States would all observe
the rights of our citizens, there would be no need of this bill. If
the States would all practice the constitutional declaration, that
'The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States,' (Article
four, section two, Constitution of the United States),
29. Id. at 32.
30. Id. at 33.
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and enforce it, as meaning that the citizen has
'The right of protection by the Government, the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and posssess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus;
to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts
of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either
real or personal; to be exempt from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State.' (Corfield v. Coryell 4 Washington's Circuit Court Reports,
p. 380),
we might very well refrain from the enactment of this bill into
a law. If they would recognize that 'general citizenship' (Story on
the Constitution, volume two, page 604) whih under this clause
entitles every citizen to security and protection of personal rights,
(Campbell v. Morris, 3 Harris & McHenry, 535,) we might safely
withhold action. And if, above all, Mr. Speaker, the States should
admit, and practice the admission, that a citizen does not surrender these rights because he may happen to be a citizen of the
State which would deprive him of them, we might, without doing
violence to the duty devolved upon us, leave the whole subject to
the several States. But, sir, the practice of the States leaves us no
avenue of escape, and we must do our duty by supplying the protection which the States deny.31
The statements of Congressmen Woodbridge and Wilson are evidence that Congress did indeed intend to "nationalize the whole
sphere of civil liberty" as John Burgess argued so long ago. 32
Congressman John A. Bingham defined the fourteenth amendment specifically in terms of the Bill of Rights: "The proposition
pending before the House is simply a proposition to arm the Congress
with the power to enforce the Bill of Rights as it stands in the
Constitution today. It 'hath that extent-no more.' " Fairman commented: "Bingham certainly says that the effect of this proposal is to
arm Congress with power to enforce the Bill of Rights: it will do this
31. Coyc. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-18. See aLso supra note 14 for noncongressional sources on this point.
32. See supra note 7.
33. Fairman, supra note 20, at 33.
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and nothing more." But then Fairman queried: "What bill of rights?"
And answered:
Once more he makes it clear by the context: The bill of rights
that says that the citizens of the United States shall be entitled to
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in
the several states (which he refers to, but misquotes, Art. IV § 2)
and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law (which is one of the fifth amendment's limitations upon the federal government). And this
measure would take from the state no authority it now enjoys
under the Constitution; it would impose no obligation to which
the state is not already bound.... Bingham, however, had been
insisting that 'the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today' that he would empower Congress to enforce against the
states, had been binding upon them ever since 1789.34
Fairman was so sure that the Bill of Rights was not applicable against
the states that he failed to see the reasonableness of Bingham's thinking. If, as Bingham believed, the rights of man are natural and inalienable, then they are his, independent of any government. The
function of government is not to grant these rights but to secure
them.3 5 Furthermore, they are to be secured against every attempt to
infringe or deny them. Freedom and the rights of which it is comprised may have been left to the protection of the states; but if the
states failed to protect them what recourse did the individual have?
The framers of the fourteenth amendment were saying in these statements that national government was empowered, indeed, obliged, to
give the individual that protection should the states refuse it. Yet,
Fairman stated that Bingham's use of the term "bill of rights" and its
identity with "privileges and immunities" and the rights to life, liberty and property was a "specious gesture," "a fine literary phrase not
referring precisely to the first eight Amendments." 3 6 Although Fairman quoted a campaign speech in which Bingham declared that the
fourteenth amendment included the rights of free speech and freedom of religion, he insisted that "never in the reported debates did
he (Bingham) refer specifically to Amendments I to VIII."'
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 33-34.
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-18, 1151-52, 1159, 1262-63.
Fairman, supra note 20, at 26.
Id. at 126.
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Senator Jacob Howard, Republican from Michigan and spokesman
of the Republican caucus on the fourteenth amendment, did, however, specifically refer to the Bill of Rights. Fairman, notes that
Howard said:
Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of
in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution. To
these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be-for they
are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and
precise nature-to these should be added the personal rights
guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances, a right appertaining to each
and all the people; the right to keep and bear arms; the right to
be exempted from the quartering of soldiers in a house without
the consent of the owner; the right to be exempt from unreasonable searches and seizures, and from any search or seizure except
by virtue of a warrant issued upon a formal oath or affidavit; the
right of an accused person to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him, and his right to be tried by an impartial
jury of the vicinage; and also the right to be secure against excessive bail and against cruel and unusual punishments.Us
Of this statement Fairman said:
Here at last is a clear statement that the new privileges and immunities clause is intended to incorporate the federal Bill of
Rights. For the first time, 'the first eight amendments' are spedfled. On this point Howard's statement seems full and unequivocal. It must be given very serious consideration, coming from the
Senator who had the measure in charge.3 9
Nevertheless, he apparently failed to consider Senator Howard's statement seriously, since he stubbornly insisted that
No one in debate ever runs down the list of the federal Bill of
Rights: religious liberty, freedom of speech and of the press, the
right to keep and bear arms, no unreasonable searches or seizures,
no compulsory self-incrimination, trial jury, [sic] grand jury, etc.
38. Id. at 57.
39. Id. at 58.
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The due process clause, and particularly the words 'life, liberty,
and property' are mentioned frequently. As we shall see in a
moment, on one occasion Bingham speaks of 'cruel and unusual
punishments.' But never, even once, does advocate or opponent
40
say 'the first eight amendments.'
Fairman insisted that the framers' thinking was obscure and superficial, and that they "had a very imperfect awareness of the essential
difficulty." He was unwilling to seek any further clarification of their
"imperfect awareness" or obscure and seemingly erroneous legal conceptions beyond the assumption that their only concern was selfish
political interests. Instead, he said: "We need not enter here into the
large subject of extrinsic aids in constitutional interpretation. That
would only complicate a fairly simple problem." Yet he did just that,
perhaps unaware of doing so when he stated that "Eighty years of
adjudication has taught us distinctions and subtleties where the men
of 1866 did not even perceive the need for analysis." 4' Fairman did
not entertain the possibility that the specific term "Bill of Rights"
was not more frequently used because it and the other terms used by
the framers to denote the rights they were seeking to protect, all referred to the same corpus of basic rights summed up in the concept
of the right to life, liberty and property. Such an explanation is suggested by the interchangeable use of the terms by those framers' quoted in this paper. Yet, "eighty years of adjudication" had blinded
Fairman to this interpretation of the framers' apparent ignorance of
legal "distinctions and subtleties."
Therefore, when Fairman charged that the framers "had a very imperfect awareness of the essential difficulty" he obviously meant that
they did not perceive their problems and their solutions as he did in
the twentieth century; nor did they use his definitions for the legal
conceptions with which they were dealing. Imposing his assumptions
and his definitions upon the framers, Fairman failed to validly answer the question that prompted his study.
Another influential legal study of the framers' intent was made by
Alexander M. Bickel in 1955.42 As Fairman responded to Justice Hugo
40.

Id. at 44-45.

41.

Id. at 9, 24, 66.

42.

Bickel,

The Original Understanding and The Segregation Decision, 69

L. REV. 1 (1955). [Hereinafter cited as Bickel]. Bickel was clerk to Justice
Felix Frankfurter when the School Desegregation Cases were first argued before
the Court in 1952.
HARV.
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Black in the Adamson Case, Bickel responded to Chief Justice Earl
Warren in the School Desegregation Cases. When these cases were
first argued before the Supreme Court in 1952, the Court ordered
counsel for both sides to investigate the intent of the framers of the
fourteenth amendment in order to answer the following questions:
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and
the State legislatures and conventions which ratified the fourteenth
amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or
did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public
schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the fourteenth amendment understood that compliance with
it would require the immediate abolition of segregation in public
schools, was it nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the
Amendment
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power
under section 5 of the amendment, abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of
future conditions, to construe the amendment as abolishing such
segregation of its own force?
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2(a) and 2(b)
do not dispose of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing the amendment, to abolish segregation in public schools?43
Chief Justice Warren, in his opinion for a unanimous Court, declared that the evidence presented concerning these questions was
inconclusive. Bickel, however, asserted that conclusive answers could
be gleaned from history. He said that "it is possible, in the Chief Justice's words, for historical materials to cast some light although they
are inconclusive and although, in any event, the clock cannot be
turned back. But only examination in some detail of the relevant
materials themselves can make clear just how this has proved possible
in the Segregation Cases."44 The "relevant materials" to which Bickel
referred were the Congressional debates concerning the fourteenth
amendment.
The questions posed by the Supreme Court which served as the
43. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. 345 U.S. 972 (1954).
44. Bickel, supra, note 42, at 6.
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basis and guide to Bickel's study were not suited to securing an understanding of the framers' perception of their own behavior. Rather,
they were actually an obstacle to such an understanding because they
sought to interpret that behavior solely in the context of an issue of
the mid-twentieth century. Thus, it is not surprising that Bickel found
the record less than clear on this issue; nevertheless he asserted that
most of the framers did not intend to include desegregated schools
within the protection of the fourteenth amendment. He supported
this conclusion by using the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a guide to the
rights and scope of protection the framers sought to include in the
fourteenth amendment.
To arrive at a definition of the rights which the framers sought to
protect, Bickel analyzed contributions of Congressman Wilson to the
Civil Rights Bill debates. He quoted Wilson's statement that "civil
rights and immunities" did not include all matters civil, social and
political. They did not include for example the right to vote. "Nor
do they mean that all citizens shall sit on the juries, or that their
children shall attend the same schools. These are not civil rights or
immunities." Wilson then went on to explain that he understood civil
rights to be "the absolute rights of individuals, such as-" 'The right
of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to
acquire and enjoy property.' " A "right," Wilson said, "is that which
any man is entitled to have, or to do, or to require from others, within
45
the limits of prescribed law."
As to immunities, Wilson stated: "A colored citizen shall not, because he is colored, be subjected to obligations, duties, pains . ...
This is the spirit and scope of the bill, and it goes not one step beyond." He also noted that the Bill was intended to put a stop "at
once and forever" to barbaric laws and inhuman treatment of blacks
by whites. From these quotations, Bickel concluded that "Wilson thus
presented the Civil Rights Bill to the House as a measure of limited
and definite objectives." 46
Yet, this definition of the scope of the Bill is not supported
by Wilson's comments even as Bickel quoted them. To protect individuals in all "that which any man is entitled to have, or to do, or
to require from others" is quite an expansive scope for any law. That
Wilson excluded unsegregated schools and jury duty from this broad
45. Quoted in Bickel, supra, note 42, at 16-17.
46. Bickel, supra note 42, at 17.
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concept of rights does not necessarily mean that he intended the Bill
to be "limited"; it means simply that he did not regard these particular rights to be among those which he designated as "the absolute
rights of individuals." Furthermore, that Wilson believed these to be
excluded from the protection of the nation does not mean that all of
the Senitors and Congressmen did; the best study of this subject condudes that the opinions in Congress ranged so widely throughout the
Reconstruction period that a definitive statement of the specific rights
Congress intended to be protected is impossible. 47 While there was a
consensus on certain specific rights, such as the right to acquire and
dispose of property, the question of school segregation was relegated
to uncertainty. Bickel recognized this when he said: "It will become
plain that the right, if any, to an unsegregated public school education resided for most men who spoke at this session in a fringe area,
where its companions were, among other less well-defined rights, suf48
frage, jury service and intermarriage."
At least as much evidence of a far more expansive nature of the
Civil Rights Act was omitted by Bickel. This evidence includes Wilson's comments clarifying his conception of civil rights. In the same
speech cited by Bickel, Wilson quoted an official opinion on the
nature and rights of United States citizenship, issued by Attorney
General Edward Bates in 1862. In discussing the rights of United
States citizens, Attorney General Bates said: "The word rights is generic, common, embracing whatever may be lawfully claimed." Wilson
also cited Bouvier's Law Dictionarywhich defined civil rights equally
broadly as "those which have no relation to the establishment, support, or management of government." 49 Having cited these authorities, Wilson concluded with the statement quoted above on page 378,
that civil rights are the natural rights of man and these are the rights
the Civil Rights Bill is intended to protect.
Bickel also failed to include important clarification of the term
"immunities" as used by Wilson, by omitting the important word,
"penalties" from Wilson's statement. One of the burdens suffered by
the Freedmen was the imposition of harsher penalties for similar
crimes committed by whites. By the Civil Rights Bill, Congress was
47. Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protedion of
the Laws", 50 COLuM. L. REv. 131 (1950).
48. Bickel, supra, note 40, at 7.
49. All quotations from CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117.
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attempting to equalize these punishments as well as access to the
courts.
To understand legislative intent, the evil meant to be cured by the
legislation must be defined. During the period of Reconstruction it
was not simply state laws that were discriminatory, but rather the
entire legal process; and the discrimination was not simply racial, it
was political as well, for white Republicans in the South suffered as
well as blacks. 50 Bickel, however, by his editing of Wilson's comments
on the concept of "immunities" and by concluding his quotations
with a reference to state laws, gave the impression that the Bill was
intended to be negative rather than affirmative, and limited only to
providing an equality in state laws. As has already been seen, Wilson's
reference to state action was not limited to state law; furthermore, it
was meant to point out violations of rights and to demonstrate the
need for federal action to protect the rights of all United States
citizens. The reader should again look at Wilson's lengthy statement
reprinted on pages 380-381. Wilson was saying that a citizen of the
United States as such is entitled to all the fundamental rights of free
men, which he equated with the privileges and immunities of the
comity clause; the problem was that citizens' enjoyment of these
rights was not being protected by the Southern states. Citizens' rights
were being infringed not only by discriminatory laws, but also by
denial of police protection and of access to the courts to redress violation of rights from private sources, such as physical harm to person
and property. Since individuals possessed these natural rights independent of any government, no government might deny or infringe
them through either positive actions or refusal to protect or redress
them. Yet, that is precisely what was happening. Since it is the duty
of all free governments to protect the rights of their citizens, the national government was obliged to do so in the face of state recalcitrance. It was not simply discriminatory laws or a mere equality with
which Wilson was concerned; it was the protection of the natural
rights of United States citizens. He made that clear when he said in
the same speech:
If citizens of the United States, as such, are entitled to possess
and enjoy the great fundamental civil rights which it is the true
office of Government to protect, and to equality in the exemp50. See supra note 14.
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dons of the law, we must of necessity be clothed with the power
to insure to each and every citizen these things which belong to
him as a constituent of the great national family.5 '
Wilson did not limit his justification of congressional action to his
theory of citizenship. He declared that express authority for the national protection of these natural rights was conferred by the thirteenth amendment:
Here, certainly, is an express delegation of power. How shall it
be exercised? Who shall select the means through which the office of this power shall effect the end designed by the people
when they placed this provision in the Constitution? Happily,
sir, we are not without light on these questions from the Supreme
2
Court.V

Wilson then quoted Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in the
case of McCulloch v. Maryland in which the Chief Justice declared
that Congress had the discretion to select the means necessary to
execute its powers and to perform its duties. The duty imposed by
the thirteenth amendment which Congress was attempting to perform, in the words of the Bill's author, Senator Trumbull, was to give
"practical effect" to the freedom thus conferred upon all inhabitants
of the United States.5 3
Without consideration of the above comments, Bickel said of Wilson's speech:
Wilson thus presented the Civil Rights Bill to the House as a
measure of limited and definite objectives. In this he followed
the lead of the majority in the Senate. Indeed, his disclaimers of
wider coverage were more specific than those made in the Senate.
And the line he laid down was followed by others who spoke for
the bill in the House. Again, the Black Codes were referred to,
and again the point was made that the term civil rights was defined by section 1, which enumerated the rights in question.54
Here is Wilson's view of the rights that were incorporated into the
Bill:
51.

CONG., GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1118.

52. Id.
53. Id. at 474.
54. Bickel, supra note 42, at 17.
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What are these rights? Certainly they must be as comprehensive as
those which belong to Englishmen. And what are they? Blackstone classifies them under three articles, as follows: 1. The right
of personal security . . . 2. The right of personal liberty . . . 3.
The right of person property ...The great fundamental rights
are the inalienable possession of both Englishmen and Americans; and I will not admit that the British constitution excels
the American Constitution in the amplitude of its provisions for
the protection of these rights. Our Constitution is not a mockery;
it is the never-failing fountain of power from whence we may
draw our justification for the passage of this bill; for there is no
right enumerated in it by general terms or by specific designation
which is not definitely embodied in one of the rights I have mentioned, or results as an incident necessary to complete defense
and enjoyment of the specific right. Now sir, I reassert that the
possession of these rights by the citizen raises by necessary implication the power in Congress to protect them. 55
While Wilson's comments depicted the Bill as definite in objective,
it was hardly limited in scope. Wilson asserted that Congress possessed
the power to protect the natural rights of free men as well as the discretion to choose whatever means it deemed appropriate to that end.
Bickel also used statements of Congressman Bingham to argue that
the Civil Rights Act was limited in scope. Bickel said:
...[C]ertainly unlike Wilson and his supporters (italics added),
he read the general term 'civil rights' broadly, or at any rate
thought it was of uncertain reach. In the first half of his speech,
it is perfectly clear that Bingham, while committing himself to
the need for safeguarding by constitutional amendment the specific rights enumerated in the body of section 1, was anything but
willing to make a similar commitment with respect to 'civil
rights' in general.5 6
Yet Bingham, who had abolitionist antecedents, is generally regarded
as the "Father of the fourteenth amendment" and stated that he intended "to arm the Congress ...with the power to enforce the bill
of rights as it stands in the constitution today."5 7
55.
56.
57.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118-19.

Bickel, supra note 42, at 24.
See pp. 381-82 supra.
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A closer look at Bingham's objection to the Civil Rights Act is
warranted, therefore. The speech above to which Bickel referred was
made by Bingham in support of his amendments to the Civil Rights
Bill, which he believed was unconstitutional. One of these amendments would strike from the Bill a clause which prohibited discrimination in any civil right. Bickel interpreted Bingham's action as narrowing the scope of the Bill to those rights specifically enumerated,
and as a sign of his unwillingness to eliminate discrimination generally.
Bingham explained the concern which prompted this amendment.58
He believed that suffrage was a civil right, and, since the bill as
originally proposed prohibited discrimination in any civil right, it
seemed to him that Congress was encroaching upon an area that the
Constitution had specifically left to the states to regulate. Therefore,
when Bingham moved to strike this general civil rights clause, he
meant to eliminate the possibility that the Bill would be interpreted
to apply to the right to vote. Nevertheless, in this same speech, Bingham declared that his object in offering his proposed constitutional
amendment was precisely to apply the Bill of Rights against the
states; he identified his purpose with that of the framers of the Civil
Rights Bill, to protect the Bill of Rights guarantees; but he maintained that such an object could only be achieved through a constitutional amendment.
Bingham was almost alone among the proponents of civil rights in
defining suffrage within that concept."19 However, to eliminate opponents' objections that the Bill included Negro suffrage, Congressman
Wilson proposed an amendment identical to Bingham's striking out
the general civil rights clause. In this connection, Wilson said, and
Bickel even quoted him to say:
I find in the bill of rights... that 'no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.' I understand that these constitute the civil rights belonging to the citizens in connection with those which are necessary for the protection and maintenance and perfect enjoyment of the rights thus
specifically named, and these are the rights to which this bill re58. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1291-1292.
59. See Kaczorowski, supra note 14, at chapter ii.
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lates, having nothing to do with subjects submitted to the control
of the States.6 0
Those subjects to which Wilson referred in the last sentence were the
rights to vote and hold office. Thus, despite this amendment, Wilson
could still say:
Mr. Speaker, the amendment which has just been read proposes
to strike out the general terms relating to civil rights. I do not
think it materially changes the bill; but some gentlemen were
apprehensive that the words we propose to strike out might give
warrant for a latitudinarian construction not intended. 01
Since Wilson believed that suffrage was not a civil right but a political
privilege, and since he believed that all of the fundamental rights of
citizens are designated by the rights to life, liberty and property, he
could indeed say that striking out this clause did not diminish the
Bill's scope or effectiveness in relation to the natural rights he sought
to protect, especially since the following clause was left untouched:
...

but the inhabitants of every race and color.., shall have the

same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property...02
To the framers, the security of person and property was equivalent
to the rights to life, liberty and property.
However, Bickel was satisfied that the Civil Rights Bill was limited
by this amendment. Failing to appreciate the distinction in the minds
of the framers between civil rights as natural rights and suffrage as
political privilege, and having assumed that most Republicans were
not sincere or strong civil rights supporters, he perceived this superficial change in the Bill to be a severely limiting one by which Congress withdrew its protection from the broad concept of civil rights.
He therefore seized upon the numerous statements of proponents of
the fourteenth amendment which equated its first section with the
Bill, and argued that the amendment was restricted in scope, as the
Bill allegedly was. He made much of the fact that Bingham failed to
60. CONG.
40, at 26.

GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1294-1295; quoted in Bickel, supra note

61 Id. at 1296; and quoted in Bickel, supra note 42, at 28.
62.

Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, §1, 14

STAT.

27.
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use in his amendment the term "civil rights," a term, Bickel noted,
that Bingham had defined as all inclusive in terms of rights. Bickel
overlooked the fact that Bingham himself made no such distinction
between "civil rights" and terms such as "privileges and immunities"
and the "rights to life, liberty and property." It is evident from the
speeches quoted by Fairman and Bickel and included in this paper
that Bingham and the others used these terms interchangeably when
referring to the same concept of natural rights. Bickel had himself
quoted Wilson as equating the term "civil rights" with tie invocation
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." Fairman had used Bingham's equation of Bin
of Rights guarantees with the privileges and immunities of the comity
clause and the rights to life, liberty and property to show that Bingham's thinking was "specious." 63 Nevertheless, Bickel concluded that
"it is difficult to interpret the deliberate choice against using the term
'civil rights' as anything but a rejection of what were deemed its wider
implications."6 4 In light of the fact that these terms were used interchangeably, Bickel's distinction would appear to be specious. The
studies of Fairman and Bickel stand as notable examples of the inadequacy of "law office history."
These studies6 5 have misinterpreted the intent of the framers of the
63. Fairman, supra note 20, at 33; see also Senator Howard's statement quoted
supra at page 383.
64. Bickel, supra note 42, at 57.
65. Alfred Avins is another contemporary legal scholar who has investigated

the question of the Framers' Intent. See Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 66
COLUm. L. REv. 873 (1966); Fourteenth Amendment Limitations on Banning Racial
Discrimination,8 Amiz. L. REv. 236 (1967); Freedom of Choice in Personal Service
Occupations: Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legislation, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 228 (1964); The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected
Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis L. J. 331
(1967); Racial Segregation in Public Accommodations: Some Reflected Light on
the FourteenthAmendment from the Civil Rights Act of 1875. 18 W. REs. L. REv.
1251 (1967); Social Equality and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding, 4 HousrON"L. REv. 640 (1967).
Avins' studies appear designed to reach certain pre-ordained conclusions. For
example, he saw the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as challenging the thirteenth amendment's proscription of involuntary servitude, since it forces proprietors of public
accommodations to service blacks against the proprietors' will. It has been charged
that Avins inaccurately cited, distorted and misrepresented his evidence which
still did not establish his case. The following statement from Ratner, Involuntary
Servitude or Inopposite Solicitude, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 502, 507 (1967) is a good rebuttal to Avins' work generally: "No purpose is served by invoking a constitutional
bogeyman to divert attention from real issues, foreclose legitimate areas of argu.
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fourteenth amendment for a variety of reasons. Handicapped by the
presentism that plagues legal scholars when they attempt to look into
the past, these authors were too involved in the problems and issues
of their own times to be able to perceive the problems and issues that
confronted Americans after the Civil War. These scholars had already
formulated definitions of the fourteenth amendment and the legal
concepts it incorporates, and they imposed their definitions upon the
framers. They therefore could not perceive the way in which the
framers themselves defined these. legal concepts or the amendment
itself. They also too narrowly restricted the sources they used to reach
their conclusions. Furthermore, they all assumed that the civil rights
program was the product of a group of extremists who were politically
motivated and not really concerned with the welfare of the Negro.
Legal scholars, of course, cannot be blamed for the failings or inadequacies of professional historians. But historians have recently
been correcting their outmoded analyses of Reconstruction, with some
help from non-historians. Jacobus tenBroek's study of the Radicals
determined that their legal conceptions were directly linked to those
of the antebellum abolitionists.6 6 He also noted that many Reconstruction Radicals had been abolitionists before the Civil War, and argued,
therefore, that the Radicals were not political schemers who acted
out of selfish interests, but were actually trying to continue the abolitionists' program of securing for Negroes the natural rights of man.
Under this interpretation, the civil rights program after the Civil
War would seem to protect those rights from hostile actions of the
states, from failures of the states to protect them, and from actions
of private individuals. tenBroek saw the goal of the Radicals as
nothing less than defining Freedmen in law as free men actually
67
imbued with all the rights of free men.
ment, and give a new veneer of plausibility to discarded social and constitutional
theories."
66. J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw (1965). The book was originally published
in 1951 under the title, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
67. Id. at 180, 187-188, 208, 211. Howard Jay Graham also examined the antislavery backgrounds of the fourteenth amendment and demonstrated the influence
of abolitionist ideas such as due process of law and equal protection of the law on
the development of the idea of United States citizenship as incorporating the in.
alienable rights spoken of in the Declaration of Independence, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 479 and 610;
after an excellent critique of previous approaches to the fourteenth amendment
that he called narrow antiquarianism, Graham related the philosophical assumptions and conceptions of the Radical framers of the amendment which he defined
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Alfred H. Kelly also acknowledged the antislavery origins of the
fourteenth amendment. 68 Like tenBroek, Kelly concluded that the
amendment was largely the product of the Radicals' ideas. However,
he raised a fundamental question which he believed was left unresolved by tenBroek's study: "did the pre-war anti-slavery idealists conceive of equality before the law as enjoining all class legislation based
upon race?" 69 If they did, he said, then one can safely conclude that
they carried their concepts into the post-War era and incorporated
them into the fourteenth amendment.
Kelly found that the Radicals did not intend to apply federal protection against all class legislation. While he said they were not afraid
to bring about revolutionary changes he did not think they intended
to include segregated schools and juries within the scope of federal
protection. Like the legal scholars previously discussed, this historian
failed to escape a presentism that caused him to measure the intent
of the framers in 1866 by the issues hnd conceptions of the 1950's. He
consequently confused the application of the power over civil rights
to specific areas with the scope of the power itself, and concluded that
the framers did not intend to transfer plenary legislative power over
civil rights to the national government.7 0 That society in 1866 did
not include desegregated schools and juries within its conception of
civil rights does not necessarily mean that it stopped short of asserting
full national power over whatever rights it did include within that
concept.
The Dunning School interpretation of the Reconstruction period
is reflected in Kelly's study. He asserted that the large body of moderates in the Republican Party had not committed themselves to the
radical position of equal rights by the spring of 1866. He suggested
that the Radicals had to be cautious in their plans for the Freedmen
as incorporating the Abolitionists' idea of United States citizenship; however, he
did not deal with the moderate wing of the Republican Party. See Graham. The
Fourteenth Amendment and School Segregation, 3 BUFFAWO L. REv. 1 (1953) and
Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1954). These and
other essays on the fourteenth amendment are reprinted in GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S
CoN rrriMoN (1968).
68. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 Mic. L. R v. 1049 (1956). Professor of constitutional history at Wayne
State University, Kelly participated in the preparation of the historical analysis ol
the fourteenth amendment in the School Desegregation Cases.
69. Id. at 1054-1055.
70. Id. at 1061, 1069, 1076-77.
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and therefore that the precise meaning of the amendment was fluid
throughout the Reconstruction period. 1 Like the contemporary legal
scholars discussed above, Kelly made the basic assumption that the
fourteenth amendment was the product of the Radicals alone whose
goal of Negro equality was not shared by the Northern public. Consequently, these scholars concluded that either the various civil rights
proposals were not intended to offer any meaningful protection, or
that any intended protection had to be tempered in order to make
the proposals acceptable to an unwilling public.
Joseph B. James attempted to relate the fourteenth amendment
to its broader historical context by investigating extra-congressional
sources.7 2 He correctly observed that racial segregation was not an
issue in 1866, and that Negro Suffrage was the political issue which
distinguished the Radicals. 7 3 However, like Benjamin Kendrick,
James overemphasized the suffrage issue, which led him to the erroneous conclusion that Republicans were dissatisfied with the civil rights
section of the fourteenth amendment.7 4 He nevertheless maintained
that the Radicals intended to confer legal equality in the rights incorporated in the Bill of Rights, if only against state action. Yet, he
also assumed that the Radicals alone were working for equality, and
doing so for political motives. Thus, he minimized any personal concern they may have had for Negro equality, and was left with the unanswered question of why the Radicals would so revolutionize the
federal system when that drastic action was unnecessary to their political goal.
The question that arises from the foregoing analysis is if the intent
of the framers of the fourteenth amendment has been inaccurately
assessed then what was the intent? What were the purposes and objectives of their actions? Other questions are raised too. We now know
that the framers received almost universal support.7 5 But how could
congressional action taken primarily for the protection of the former
slaves receive such widespread support from a racist society? That
question is particularly important since it must be answered before
71. Id. at 1084-1085.
72. J. B. JAMES, FRAMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956).
73. Id. at 3-20, 47, 105, 191, 200-201.
74.

This point is discussed in Kaczorowski, supra note 14, at chapter ii.
See McKitrick, supra note 9; W. R. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS
AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1867 (1963); and L. and J. H. Cox, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE,
AND PREJUDICE, 1865-1866: DILEMMA OF RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA (1963).
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one can argue that action taken by the framers was not merely a minimal protection of fundamental rights, but a full guarantee. Closely
related to that problem is the question of why action was taken at all.
An analysis of these questions is beyond the purview of the present
paper.7 6 However, this discussion of the literature concerning the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment has demonstrated
that much evidence exists that is contradictory to the narrow interpretations of the amendment that have been offered previously. Thus,
the question is still open. The real meaning of the amendment and
the scope of power it was intended to vest in the national government
to act in the area of civil rights is yet to be determined. While this
paper cannot provide the real meaning of the amendment, it can
offer some suggestions that might lead to a more accurate assessment
of the intent of the framers.
Any new attempt to assess the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment must be mindful of the conceptual and methodological inadequacies of previous studies. Conceptually, such an
attempt would have to relate the framers' actions regarding civil rights
to the broader issues of their period, not to the issues of our own. It
would also have to use the framers' definitions of those issues and
consider the alternatives the framers suggested for their resolution
and the legal tools they believed were available to them for so doing.
Furthermore, those legal tools would have to be conceived and defined as the framers conceived and defined them, not as they are defined today after one hundred years of modification through judicial
application. Methodologically, such a study must go beyond congressional sources to ascertain the way in which the framers perceived
their predicament and the actions they took to meet it. Contemporary
commentary upon the framers' perceptions would be useful either as
corroborative or contradictory to what the framers said they were doing. Rich insights into the intent of the framers are also available
from the people and agencies that were charged with the duty of enforcing fourteenth amendment concepts of citizenship, the privileges
and immunities of United States citizens and the equal protection of
the law. Records of the Freedmen's Bureau and the Union Army of
occupation in the South have been untouched in relation to this question. Yet, those organizations were among the primary agencies direct76. The author is currently concluding a study that attempts to answer these
questions using the conceptualizations and methodology suggested in this article.
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ed by Congress to enforce its enactments. Scholars have also overlooked state and federal cases involving fourteenth amendment
concepts that were adjudicated between 1866 and the Slaughterhouse
Cases of 1873. These initial judicial interpretations of fourteenth
amendment concepts might offer a far more accurate insight into the
framers' intent that those Supreme Court decisions of 1870's and
1880's to which legal scholars have restricted their investigations of
77
the judicial response to the fourteenth amendment.
Contrary to former Chief Justice Earl Warren's conclusion in the
School Desegregation Cases, the evidence surrounding the intent of
the framers of the fourteenth amendment is not inconclusive. It
simply has not been fully and properly utilized. Resolution of this
question is not only vital for the law and civil rights, it also offers a
significant opportunity for the professional historian to provide the
"modern architectural materials" spoken of by Paul L. Murphy which
the courts might use to construct an understanding of the intent of
the framers of our laws and constitutional amendments. As for the
fourteenth amendment itself, if the Senators and Congressmen cited
and quoted above are representative of the rest of Congress, then resolving the question of the framers' intent along the lines suggested
by their statements reported herein would have a most profound impact upon the law and upon the very structure of our government.
Such an interpretation of the framers' intent could revive the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment from the
dormant state to which it was consigned by the Supreme Court in 1873.
The national authority to protect civil rights would no longer be
contingent upon a showing of some form of state action in connection
with infringements of those rights. No longer would the national
power be forced into legal gymnastics to secure these rights against
denials stemming from unofficial sources. The national government
would thereby be provided with the authority and obligation, if not
the motivation, to establish a truly national standard for the enjoyment of all civil rights which could be applied directly to private as
well as state infringements. If the general intent of the framers of the
fourteenth amendment was the incorporation of the natural rights
of free men into United States citizenship, then they wrought nothing
less than a revolution in American federalism.
of

77. See, e.g., Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
Rights: The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949).

